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REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S POINT LA. 
THE REVERSAL OF DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION HERE, 
DESPITE A CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND REASONABLE 
DOUBT INSTRUCTION, EXEMPLIFIES THE HARM CAUSED BY 
THE FLAWED IRELAND/ROBERTSON THREE-PART TEST 
Defendant asserts that the State has not argued that the Ireland test causes harm. 
See Br. Rsp. at 15-16. The harm is obvious from the instant case. Although the reasonable 
doubt instruction given here satisfied Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994), the court of 
appeals felt constrained to reverse under State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1232 (Utah 
1997), overruled on other grounds by State v. Weeks, 2002 UT98,^25 n.l 1, 61 P.3d 1000. 
State v. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, \ 22, 84 P.3d 841. Thus, the result of following the 
Ireland!Robertson in this case was the reversal of a constitutionally sound conviction. 
1
 State v. Ireland, 113 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1989). 
This result is troubling because it exalts form over substance. One reason for 
reversing defendant's conviction is that the judge failed to tell the jury the State must obviate 
all reasonable doubt. He instructed the jury that defendant was "presumed innocent until 
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt," that the burden was "upon the prosecution to 
prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt," and that "[t]he presumption of 
innocence must prevail unless and until you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the 
guilt of the defendant." R. 164-65. But because the judge did not utter the words obviate or 
eliminate, defendant's conviction was reversed—despite the fact that even defendant has 
never claimed that the omission of these words caused any juror to misunderstand the 
prosecution's constitutional burden. 
Indeed, the most insidious feature of the Ireland test is its preoccupation with magic 
words. Victor teaches that "the Constitution does not require that any particular form of 
words be used in advising the jury of the government's burden of proof." Victor, 511 U.S. 
at 5. This Court has similarly declared that "[n]o talismanic phraseology is required to 
articulate the reasonable doubt standard." State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 346 (Utah 1993). 
Yet Ireland takes the opposite approach. So while defendant concedes that "instructions may 
not specifically need to use the word 'obviate,'" he notes that "[i]n each of the cases in which 
this Court has applied the Ireland requirements, it has approved of reasonable doubt 
instructions that have included the word 'obviate.'" Br. Rsp. at 33, 34-35 (emphasis added, 
citations omitted). Similarly, he complains that the trial court here said "imaginary doubt" 
rather than "fanciful... possibility." Br. Rsp. at 35-36. And although the court stated that 
2 
"[t]he burden is upon the prosecution to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt," R. 165 (emphasis added), defendant argues that the instruction's "failure to specify 
that 'the State' has the burden to eliminate 'all' reasonable doubt violates minimal 
constitutional requirements." Br. Rsp. at 34. This focus on word choice over substance is 
harmful. 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S POINT LB. 
THE IRELAND DISSENT IGNORED CONTROLLING CASE LAW 
Defendant defends the Ireland dissent on the ground that it reflected then-current legal 
trends. He cites Waldrop v. Jones, 11 F.3d 1308, 1315(11th Cir. 1996), three times for the 
proposition that many attacks on reasonable doubt instructions "'were percolating in both 
state and federal courts during the 1970's and 1980's." Br. Rsp. at 18; see also Br. Rsp. at 
19,22. 
Defendant fails to note that each of the attacks cited in Waldrop ultimately failed. See 
United States v. Muckenstrum, 515 F.2d 568, 570-71 (5th Cir.) (approving instruction 
contrasting reasonable doubt with "a mere possible doubt or a speculative, imaginary or 
forced doubt, because everything relating to human affairs is open to some possible or 
imaginary doubt"), cert denied 423 U.S. 1032 (1975); Bryant v. State, 348 So. 2d 1136,1138 
(Ala. Crim. App.) (approving instruction stating "that a reasonable doubt means, among other 
things, 'a real and substantial doubt... after considering the evidence'"), cert, denied sub 
nom. State ex rel. Attorney General, 348 So. 2d 1138 (Ala.1977); Hall v. State, 306 So. 2d 
290,293 (Ala. Crim. App. 1974) (approving instruction stating, "A reasonable doubt means 
3 
a real doubt or a substantial doubt growing out of the evidence. It is a doubt for which a 
reason can be given."), cert denied, 306 So. 2d 294 (1975). Accordingly, these cases offer 
no foundation for the Ireland dissent. 
Defendant asserts that the State "ignores this context and views this Court's decisions 
in isolation." Br. Rsp. at 19. Defendant's cases, all of which support the State's position, 
are peripheral and may be safely ignored. Ignoring controlling case law is a different matter. 
The State's opening brief asserted, "The Ireland dissent ignored at least five 
controlling cases—Hopt, Neel, Sullivan, McClain, and Tillman—that had approved 
reasonable doubt instructions containing the very elements the dissent described as 'clearly 
erroneous.'" Br. Pet. at 13. Defendant makes no attempt to defend the Ireland dissent against 
this charge, apart from claiming generally that "Justice Stewart cited relevant authorities." 
Br. Rsp. at 20 (boldface and underlining omitted). Like Ireland itself, defendant ignores 
Hoptv. People, 120 U.S. 430 (1887), State v. Neel, 23 Utah 541, 65 P. 494 (1901), State v. 
Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 110, 307 P.2d 212 (1957), and State v. McClain, 706 P.2d 603 (Utah 
1985), all factually relevant United States or Utah Supreme Court precedents. Theories 
fermenting in legal journals do not bind this Court, and precedents approving reasonable 
doubt instructions in Alabama offer no basis to abrogate reasonable doubt instructions in 
Utah. Justice Stewart did not, and defendant has not, addressed the case law that should have 
informed and controlled the Ireland opinion. 
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REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S POINT I.C. 
AS INTERPRETED BY DEFENDANT AND THE COURT OF 
APPEALS, THE IRELAND/ROBERTSON THREE-PART TEST IS 
NOT CONSISTENT WITH SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT 
Defendant contends that "the Ireland test is consistent with U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent." Br. Rsp. at 27 (boldface and underlining omitted). He also contends that the 
instruction in the instant case violated the three-part test. Id. at 32. Both contentions cannot 
be true. Victor's jury instruction is indistinguishable from the instruction given here. Either 
both instructions satisfy the test or both fail it. As read by defendant and the court of appeals, 
both fail Ireland's three-part test. For this reason, the court of appeals correctly concluded 
that the test was inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. 
In Victor, the Court considered reasonable doubt instructions given in two different 
cases. The instruction in the case of a defendant named Sandoval is most relevant here: 
A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until the contrary 
is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt whether his guilt is satisfactorily 
shown, he is entitled to a verdict of not guilty. This presumption places upon 
the State the burden of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not a mere possible doubt; 
because everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral 
evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the 
case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, 
leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel 
an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge. 
Victor, 511 U.S. at 7. As shown by the Court's italicization, Sandoval challenged two 
aspects of this instruction. Sandoval's primary challenge focused on the phrases "moral 
evidence" and "moral certainty." Id. at 10. The instant case presents no similar issue. 
5 
But Sandoval also challenged "the portion of the charge in which the judge instructed 
the jury that a reasonable doubt is 'not a mere possible doubt.'5' Id. at 17. The Court had no 
trouble concluding that, in light of the instruction's observation that "everything 'is open to 
some possible or imaginary doubt/" the jury would necessarily have understood the term 
"mere possible doubt" to mean "fanciful doubt." Id. It thus approved the instruction. Id. 
The Victor instruction violates the Ireland test to precisely the same extent as the 
instruction given here does, because the two are materially identical. Here is the language 
from the Fzcfor-approved instruction: 
Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not a mere possible doubt; 
because everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral 
evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. 
Victor, 511 U.S. at 7 (emphasis omitted). Here is the language from Instruction No. 15: 
Reasonable doubt is required, not doubt which is merely possible, since 
everything in human affairs is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. . . 
R. 165. The two instructions use the same language in the same way. Both refer to a merely 
possible doubt. Neither declares that the State must obviate all reasonable doubt. 
According to both defendant and the court of appeals, Instruction No. 15 violates the 
first and third prongs of the Ireland test See Br. Rsp. at 32-33; Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, f 22. 
If this is true, the Victor instruction also violates the first and third prongs of the Ireland tost 
Consequently, the court of appeals correctly concluded that" Victor cannot be reconciled with 
the three-part tes t . . . " Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, ^ 21. Defendant's contrary claim fails. 
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REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S POINT I.D. 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS BASED ON THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
AND THIS COURT'S INHERENT SUPERVISORY POWER ARE 
NEW CLAIMS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT 
Defendant contends that even if the three-part Irelandtest is inconsistent with United 
States Supreme Court precedent, it finds support in the Utah Constitution and this Court's 
inherent supervisory powers. Br. Rsp. at 30-31. 
Defendant's state constitutional claim is presented for the first time. Defendant 
argued in the court of appeals that the jury instruction violated his "due process and jury trial 
rights" and, as "structural error," required reversal. Id. at 13,16. "Although at the beginning 
of his brief Defendant cite[d] to Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution... and Article 
I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution . . ., Defendant never argued, either at trial or on 
appeal, that his rights under the Utah Constitution had been violated." Reyes, 2004 UT App 
8, f 14, n.2. Thus, the court of appeals never addressed such a claim. 
Defendant challenges this conclusion, pointing to his reply brief in the court of 
appeals. Br. Rsp. at 31, n.2. Defendant did mention "the Utah Constitution" in his reply 
brief. See Reply at 6. But even if this fleeting reference were sufficient to raise a state 
constitutional claim—which it is not—raising it for the first time in a reply brief violates rule 
24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure: "Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any 
new matter set forth in the opposing brief." Issues raised for the first time in a reply brief 
will not be considered. State v. Kruger, 2000 UT 60, \ 21-22, 6 P.3d 1116. 
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Defendant's state constitutional claim is also inadequately briefed. See Br. Rsp. at 30-
31. This Court has "encouraged parties briefing state constitutional issues to use historical 
and textual evidence, sister state law, and policy arguments in the form of economic and 
sociological materials to assist us in arriving at a proper interpretation of the provision in 
question." Society of Separationists v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 921 n.6 (Utah 1993). 
Defendant attempts none of this analysis. He fails even to cite or quote any state 
constitutional provision. See Br. Rsp. at 30-31. 
The argument lacks merit in any event. Neither Ireland nor any other case has ever 
connected the three-part test to the Utah Constitution. 
Similarly, defendant has no "supervisory powers" claim. He has throughout this 
litigation maintained that the three-part Ireland/Robertson test was constitutionally based. 
See Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, f 14, n.2. He now argues for the first time that, alternatively, it 
is merely an expression of this Court's "inherent supervisory powers." Br. Rsp. at 31 
(quoting Brown, 853 P.2d at 857). Issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be 
considered. State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105,1113 (Utah 1994). Accordingly, this claim will 
not be considered.2 
2
 This Court should in any event exercise its supervisory power over lower courts with 
caution. "This court's supervisory power is an inherent power which has been recognized 
in many cases." State v. Bennett, 2000 UT 34, \ 13, 999 P.2d 1 (Durham, J., concurring in 
the result) (citing 15 cases). It "stems from [the Court's] authority 'to adopt rules of 
procedure and evidence to be used in the courts of the state.'" State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 
123, f 81, 63 P.3d 621 (Durrant, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). This citation 
to Utah Const, art. VIII, § 4 ("The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and 
evidence to be used in the courts of the state and shall by rule manage the appellate process") 
could be read to imply that the Court's supervisory power is limited to rule-making. 
8 
REPLY TO POINT I.F. 
VIOLATION OF THE THREE-PART TEST ALONE IS 
NECESSARILY HARMLESS 
Defendant contends that "invalid reasonable doubt instructions require reversal as a 
matter of law." Br. Rsp. at 37. On the contrary, if a reasonable doubt instruction merely 
offends some formal requirement of the three-part test, reversal is not required. See State v. 
Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1148 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., concurring in the result, joined by 
Durham and Zimmerman, JJ.) (affirming despite Ireland violations). In fact, "so long as the 
court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant's guilt be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt," any Ireland error is necessarily harmless. Victor, 511 U.S. at 5. To 
reverse for violating the three-part test alone would serve merely to punish a trial judge for 
conveying the right substance in the wrong words. 
In any event, while this residuum of undifferentiated judicial authority has been 
invoked with some frequency since State ex rel Clatter buck, 700 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 
1985), its precise sources, character, and limits remain shadowy. Its bounds have never been 
staked or even debated. How a party would brief an issue involving the Court's inherent 
supervisory power is unclear. Indeed, this power is so ill-defined that one justice of this 
Court, referring to "our so-called supervisory power," added, "whatever that means apart 
from our appellate power." State v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 350, 360, n.6 (Utah 1996) (Stewart, 
J., dissenting). Similarly, the question of whether to invoke supervisory power to fill 
perceived gaps in state criminal rules or constitutional provisions recently splintered this 
Court. See Maestas, 2002 UT 123, \ 45 (Durham, C.J.); ^  80-83 (Durrant, J., dissenting in 
part and concurring in part); ^  140-41 (Russon, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
Such questions linger in the federal arena as well. "Unencumbered by doctrinal 
limitations, the open-ended language of the phrase "supervisory power" has invited an 
expansive interpretation." Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal 
Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1433, 1434 (1984) (referring to the federal judiciary). See also United States v. 
Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 (1980) (holding that inherent supervisory power should not be 
employed to upset carefully balanced constitutional doctrines). 
9 
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BRIEF OF CROSS-RESPONDENT 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether not repeating preliminary instructions at the close of evidence "offends 
some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to 
be ranked as fundamental" and thus requires reversal. 
On writ of certiorari, this Court will "review the court of appeals' decision for 
correctness and give its conclusions of law no deference." Newspaper Agency Corp. V. 
Auditing DzY, 938 P.2d 266, 267 (Utah 1997). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The question presented requires the Court to interpret the following rules, set out in 
foil in addendum A: 
UtahR.Crim.P. 17; 
UtahR. Crim.P. 19. 
ARGUMENT 
ANY ERROR COMMITTED BY THE TRIAL COURT IN NOT 
REPEATING PRELIMINARY JURY INSTRUCTIONS AT THE 
CLOSE OF EVIDENCE DID NOT OFFEND DUE PROCESS AND 
WAS IN ANY EVENT HARMLESS BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT 
The trial court The trial court split its instructions, reading some before and some 
after the evidence was presented. See R. 229: 6, 9, 230: 171-72. Before evidence was 
presented, the court read and provided each juror with a copy of instructions 1 through 18. 
R. 229: 9; R. 151-68. These preliminary instructions covered the following topics: 
1. Duties of the judge and jury 
2. Order of presentation 
3. What constitutes evidence 
4. Note-taking 
5. Avoiding outside influence and reserving judgment 
6. Reading the instructions as a whole 
7. Witness credibility 
8. Rulings on objections 
9. Judge's opinions 
10. Verdict based on admissible evidence 
11. Direct vs. circumstantial evidence 
12. Criminal charge creates no inference of guilt 
13. Not guilty plea 
14. Presumption of innocence 
15. Burden of proof/reasonable doubt 
16. Defendant's right to silence 
17. Defendant as a witness 
18. Resolving evidentiary conflicts 
R. 151-68. After presentation of the evidence, the judge reminded the jury that he had 
previously read instructions 1 through 18, then read and provided each juror with a copy of 
11 
instructions 19 through 32. R. 230:171; R. 169-84.3 Each of the elements instructions, Nos. 
25 and 26, reminded the jury three times that they could convict only upon finding each 
element "beyond a reasonable doubt." R. 175-77. Finally, in closing argument, both counsel 
reminded the jury of the prosecution's burden of proof, on which the court had instructed the 
jury before opening statements. See R. 230: 173, 187, 196-98. 
Court of appeals. Defendant claimed in the court of appeals that "[i]n refusing to 
give the jury all of the instructions at the close of the evidence, the trial judge violated his 
duty to instruct the jury and he deprived Mr. Reyes of his right to a fair trial." Br. Aplt. at 
17. This manner of instructing the jury, defendant argued, violated both "Utah law and due 
process." Id 
3
 Instructions 19 through 32 covered the following topics: 
19. Avoiding racial prejudice 
20. Intent 
21. Motive 
22. Act and intent 
23. Omissions 
24. Considering counts separately 
25. Elements of count I 
26. Elements of count II 
27. Attempt 
28. Intentional and knowing defined 
29. Dangerous weapon 
30. Deliberation 
31. Juror conduct 
32. Verdict forms 
R.230: 171; R. 169-84. 
12 
The court of appeals agreed to a point. It agreed that the "plain language" of rule 
17(g)(6), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, "indicates that a trial court must instruct the jury 
at the close of evidence." Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, f^ 24. "In order that there be no more 
confusion," the court added, "[w]here elementary legal principles that will govern the 
proceedings are given to the jury as a part of the orientation, the trial judge must repeat all 
such legal principles in its charge to the jury, where such legal principles include matters of 
law vital to the rights of a defendant." Id. at «f 25 (quoting State v. Marquez, 660 P.2d 1243, 
1249 (Ariz. App. 1983)). The court did not reach defendant's due process claim. Id. at ^ f 26, 
n.7. 
Although the court held that the trial court's method of instructing the jury was error, 
it also held that repeating the preliminary jury instructions at the close of evidence would not 
have altered the verdict—that the error was, in effect, harmless: 
The time period separating the trial court's reading of the preliminary 
instructions from the close of evidence was less than twenty-four hours. 
Moreover, when the jurors retired to deliberate, they were provided with a 
written copy of every preliminary and final jury instruction. Finally, despite 
Defendant's assertions to the contrary, this case was not a close credibility 
contest over the issue of consent. Other than Defendant's testimony, all of the 
relevant evidence demonstrates that the victim engaged in sex against her will. 
The victim had known Defendant for less than half-an-hour. She immediately 
reported the incident to her boyfriend and told him and the security guard at 
Bricks nightclub that she had just been raped. Finally, the security guard 
confirmed that it appeared that the victim had recently been in "a scuffle" 




Defendant's claim here. Defendant claims that simple harmlessness was the 
incorrect standard. Analogizing to Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993), he argues that 
the timing of the court's instructions constituted structural error. Br. Cross-Pet. at 43-44. 
Failing that, he argues that "[e]ven if no structural error occurred, prejudice should be 
presumed" when the court fails to remind the jurors of the presumption of innocence, the 
burden of proof, and the meaning of proof beyond a reasonable doubt at the close of 
evidence. Id. at 44. Failing that, he argues that "reversal is required because the State must 
show harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt," inasmuch as the timing of the court's 
instructions was a "nonstructural constitutional error[]." Id. Finally, he argues that "the 
combination of the failure to repeat the preliminary instructions with the erroneous 
reasonable doubt instruction amounted to cumulative error." Id. at 47. 
Defendant does not challenge the court of appeals' determination that the alleged error 
was harmless. 2004 UT App 8, \ 29. He claims rather that the court used too lenient a 
standard to determine harm. Defendant argues, in other words, that the error, though perhaps 
harmless, was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. And of course, if the error was 
structural, the conviction must be reversed without resort to any harmlessness analysis. 
A. The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure permit the court to instruct 
the jury before opening statements and do not require the court to 
repeat these instructions at the close of evidence. 
The court of appeals should have begun its analysis with 19, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. Rule 19 governs jury instructions. The first two sentences of rule 19(a) expressly 
allow the court to instruct the jury before opening statements: 
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After the jury is sworn and before opening statements, the court may instruct 
the jury concerning the jurors' duties and conduct, the order of proceedings, 
the elements and burden of proof for the alleged crime, and the definition of 
terms. The court may instruct the jury concerning . . . any matter the court in 
its discretion believes will assist the jurors in comprehending the case. 
This rule authorizes the trial court to instruct the jury on "the elements and burden of proof 
for the alleged crime" before opening statements. It does not require, suggest, or imply that 
the trial court must re-read these preliminary instructions later. 
Rule 17, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, governs trials. Subpart (g)(6) directs the 
trial court to instruct the jury at the close of evidence and at any other appropriate time: 
(g) After the jury has been impaneled and sworn, the trial 
shall proceed in the following order: 
(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any other 
appropriate time, the court shall instruct the jury;. .. 
Like rule 19(a), this rule does not require, suggest, or imply that the trial court must re-read 
preliminary instructions later. 
The meaning of these rules is plain from their language: "before opening statements, 
the court may instruct the jury" on various matters, including "the elements and burden of 
proof for the alleged crime"; in addition, the court must instruct the jury "when the evidence 
is concluded and at any other appropriate time." The rules contain no requirement that any 
particular instruction be given at any particular time or that any be repeated. 
The court of appeals' plain language argument fails because it ignores relevant 
language in the rules. Rule 17(a) does not direct the trial court to instruct the jury "[w]hen 
the evidence is concluded." Utah R. Crim. P. 17(g)(6). It directs the trial court to instruct the 
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jury "[w]hen the evidence is concluded and at any other appropriate time." Id. (emphasis 
added). And lest there be any confusion, rule 19(a) makes clear that "[a]fter the jury is sworn 
and before opening statements" is an appropriate time. The trial court's manner of 
instructing the jury thus fully complied with the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Defendant relies on five cases that, he contends, construe "court rules or statutes 
similar to Rules 17(g)(6) and 19(g)." Br. Cross-Pet. at 39. However, none involves rules 
permitting the judge to instruct "at any . . . appropriate time" and "[a]fter the jury is sworn 
and before opening statements." The rules construed in these cases simply direct the court 
to instruct after the close of evidence. See State v. Jackson, 695 P.2d 742, 743 (Ariz. 1985) 
("the judge shall then [after closing arguments] charge the jury"); State v. Bennett, 789 
S.W.2d 436, 438 (Ark. 1990) ("When the evidence is concluded, the court shall, on motion 
of either party, instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case . . . " ) ; Little v. State, 498 
S.E.2d 284,287 (Ga. App. 1998) (stating that the relevant statute "requires that the trial court 
shall instruct the jury in the law afer the closing arguments are completed"); State v. Comen, 
553 N.E.2d 640, 644 (Ohio 1990) ("the court shall instruct the jury after the arguments are 
completed"); State v. Nelson, 587 N.W.2d 439,444 (S.D. 1998) ("[T]he court shall read its 
instructions to the jury" at the close of the evidence and before final argument). 
Consequently, none of these cases is helpful here. 
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B. Any error in the timing of the jury instructions did not offend the 
Due Process Clause, 
Defendant claims that the trial court's "failure to repeat the jury instructions at the 
close of the evidence violated due process of law." Br. Cross-Pet. at 41 (boldface, 
underlining, and capitalization omitted). Defendant's due process claim lays the foundation 
for his contention that the court's alleged error requires reversal even if it was harmless. 
Because he provides no separate state constitutional analysis, this claim is limited to federal 
due process. See State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862, 873 n.6 (Utah 1993). 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids any State to "deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Nevertheless, a state "is free to 
regulate the procedure of its courts in accordance with its own conception of policy and 
fairness, unless in so doing it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and 
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 
U.S. 97, 105 (1934); see also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1934) (due process 
protects principles "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"). 
A defendant is entitled to relief only if he establishes "'not merely that the instruction 
is undesirable, erroneous, or even universally condemned,' but that it violated some 
[constitutional rigat]" Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974) (quoting Cupp 
v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141,146 (1973)). The question is whether the error "so infected the 
entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 
62, 72 (1991) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141,147 (1973)). The instructions must 
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be considered as a whole and in the context of the trial record. Id. In addition, reviewing 
courts "generally presume that a jury will follow the instructions given it." Menzies, 889 
P.2d at 401 (citations omitted). 
The Supreme Court has rejected due process challenges to state procedural rules 
involving methods and burdens of proof. See, e.g., Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43 
(1996) (rejecting due process challenge to statute providing that defendant's intoxication 
could not be considered in determining mental state for crime of murder) (per Scalia, J., with 
the chief justice and two other justices concurring, and one justice concurring in the 
judgment); Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20,34 (1992) (rejecting due process challenge to state 
rule imposing a burden of production on recidivist challenging validity of prior conviction); 
Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445 (1992) (rejecting due process challenge to statute 
placing on defendant the burden of establishing his incompetence to stand trial); Patterson 
v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977) (rejecting due process challenge to rule placing on 
defendant the burden of proving affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance to 
reduce murder to manslaughter). 
Like the state court practices challenged in these cases, the trial court's refusal to 
repeat preliminary instructions does not "offend[] some principle of justice so rooted in the 
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Snyder, 291 U.S. 
at 105. On the contrary, it is likely that most of our people could search their traditions and 
consciences without discovering any opinion relating to the instruction of juries. Nor has 
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defendant shown that re-reading preliminary instructions is "implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty." Palko, 302 U.S. at 325. 
Defendant cites no case from the United States Supreme Court or the Utah Supreme 
Court holding or hinting that the manner of instructing the jury employed here violates the 
Due Process Clause. And the state cases he cites do not support his position. 
For example, in Nelson, the South Dakota Supreme Court reversed for cumulative 
error after noting that the trial court's failure to instruct on the presumption of innocence and 
the burden of proof at the conclusion of trial, while a statutory violation, might not, standing 
alone, affect Nelson's substantial rights. 587 N.W.2d at 444, 447. 
InLittlev. State,\9% S.E.2d284(Ga. App. 1998), the Georgia Court of Appeals states 
that a failure of the trial court to instruct on the presumption of innocence, the burden of 
proof, and the standard of proof "would be a violation of the defendant's state and federal 
constitutional due process rights." Id. at 287. This incontrovertible proposition is not at 
issue here. 
State v. Woolcock, 518 A.2d 1377,1384 (Conn. 1986), holds that pre-instructing the 
jury after the state's first witness (the victim) had been sworn, and again at the close of 
evidence, "did not violate the defendant's federal or state constitutional rights." Id at 1389. 
State v. Comen, 553 N.E.2d 640, 644 (Ohio 1990); People v. Newman, 385 N.E.2d 
598 (N.Y. 1978); Bennett v. State, 789 S.W.2d 436 (Ark. 1990); State v. Romanosky, 859 
P.2d 741, 742 (Ariz. 1993); and State v. Johnson, 842 P.2d 1287 (Ariz. 1992), do not 
mention due process. Johnson does hold, contrary to defendant's claim here, that failure to 
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re-instruct the jury on the burden of proof, though error, is not "fundamental" error. Id. at 
1288. 
Nor is scholarly opinion as unanimous as defendant suggests. Br. Cross-Pet. at 40. 
Studies looking at instructing the jury both before and after the presentation of evidence are 
"somewhat mixed." Joel D. Lieberman, What Social Science Teaches Us About the Jury 
Instruction Process, 3 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y &L. 589, 631 (1997). A 1987 study found that 
giving instructions both before and after the presentation of evidence affected the verdict. 
Id. But a 1991 study found that re-instructing participants "did not affect verdict choice, 
interpretation of the evidence presented, or recall of facts related to the case." Id. at 632. 
In sum, neither Supreme Court precedent, nor Utah precedent, nor the precedent of 
any other court establishes or even suggests that the Utah rules providing for preliminary 
instructions violate due process. 
C. Any error in the timing of the jury instructions was nei ther 
constitutional nor structural. 
The United States Supreme Court has found structural error in only a limited class of 
cases. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (a total deprivation of the right to 
counsel); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (lack of an impartial trial judge); Vasquez v. 
Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (unlawful exclusion of grand jurors of defendant's race); 
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984) (the right to self-representation at trial); Waller 
v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984) (the right to a public trial); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 
275 (1993) (erroneous reasonable-doubt instruction to jury). The constitutional violation in 
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each of these cases is a "similar structural defect affecting the framework within which the 
trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself." Arizona v. Fulminante, 
499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991). 
Jury instructions that violate due process do not constitute structural error, nor is harm 
presumed. See, e.g., Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 526-527 (1979); Rose v. Clark, 
478 U.S. 570, 584, (1986). This is true even of a jury instruction containing a presumption 
that would relieve the State of its burden of proving every element beyond a reasonable 
doubt. See Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 265-67 (1989) (per curiam) (reversing and 
remanding for determination of harm). 
Even if the alleged error here was neither structural nor automatically reversible, 
defendant urges this Court to impose upon the State the burden of demonstrating that the 
alleged error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Br. Cross-Pet. at 44. This is the 
standard for assessing harm following constitutional error. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 
18,24 (1967). However, because the jury instructions here did not violate the Due Process 
Clause, Chapman's harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard does not apply. 
Again, defendant's cited cases aid him little. On the one hand, the Georgia Court of 
Appeals did state that "[a] trial court's failure to repeat such charges after closing argument 
flirts with reversal," and, after a confusing discussion of due process, reversed on the ground 
that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Little v. State, 498 S.E.2d 284, 
287-89 (Ga. App. 1998). On the other hand, the Georgia Supreme Court characterized the 
21 
practice of instructing the jury after closing arguments merely as "the better rule" and applied 
the ordinary harmlessness standard. Griffith v. State, 444 S.E.2d 794, 795-96 (Ga. 1994). 
In another case cited by defendant, State v. Owens, 632 N.E.2d 1301 (Ohio App. 
1993), the Ohio Court of Appeals applied the Chapman standard, but held that prematurely 
instructing thejury was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 1306. However, the Ohio 
Supreme Court does not apply the Chapman standard in this circumstance. See State v. 
Comen, 553 N.E.2d 640, 644 (Ohio 1990) (affirming conviction on ground that defendant 
failed to demonstrate harm). 
If this Court finds that not repeating preliminary instructions was error, it should, 
following Griffith and Comen, apply the ordinary harmless standard and conclude that the 
error was harmless, as the court of appeals held. 
D. Any error here was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Defendant tacitly concedes that he cannot show the alleged error was harmful. Rather, 
he argues that the State must show harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. If this Court 
determines that not repeating preliminary instructions was constitutional error, and thus that 
the Chapman standard applies, it should also conclude that the error was harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Owens, a case cited by defendant, demonstrates why any error here was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In Owens, the Ohio Court of Appeals held that 
prematurely instructing the jury was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court noted 
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that the trial court gave full and complete jury instructions, "albeit prematurely," and the jury 
took a set of written instructions into deliberations. Owens, 632 N.E.2d at 1306. 
As in Owens, the trial court here gave full and complete—though arguably 
premature—instructions. Furthermore, the time separating the preliminary and final 
instructions here was less than 24 hours: the preliminary instructions were read at 11:17 a.m. 
on 31 October 2002; the final jury instructions were read at 9:37 a.m. the following day. 
See R. 138-39. Also, as in Owens, each juror had a written copy of all preliminary and final 
instructions during deliberations. R. 229: 9; R. 230: 171. In addition, the elements 
instructions reminded the jury another six times that they could convict only upon finding 
each element "beyond a reasonable doubt." R. 175-77. Similarly, the State's burden of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt was impressed upon the jury by both prosecutor and defense 
counsel in closing. R. 230: 173, 187, 196-98. 
Finally, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because "this case was not 
a close credibility contest over the issue of consent." Reyes, 2004 UT App 8,128. Ashley 
was on the phone when the rape began and her boyfriend confirmed that the phone went 
dead; she reported the rape immediately and by all accounts appeared to have just undergone 
a traumatic experience; the encounter occurred late at night, in the middle of winter, in a dark 
alley; she was without a coat and was left to walk back to the club; and defendant and Ashley 
had met only minutes earlier. See Br. Pet. at 3-6. 
The jury did not reject defendant's story of a consensual sexual encounter because of 
the timing of the court's instructions. They rejected it because no rational juror could have 
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credited defendant's tale of wooing a girl less than half his age with a pack of cigarettes and 
the line, "You like sexo?" R. 229: 141, 144-45. They rejected it because they knew that 
Ashley did not pull her pants down, ask defendant if he preferred inside or outside the car, 
and bend over the hood of his car on a cold Valentine's Day night, as he claimed. R. 229: 
145-47. They rejected it because they knew that she did not return to Bricks looking roughed 
up, "very shaken," and as if she "had been through something traumatic" merely because she 
had shared with defendant what he delicately referred to as "that moment." R. 229: 76, 85, 
146-47. In short, the jury rejected defendant's story for very the reason the judge stated at 
sentencing: "I found it incred[ible]." R. 226: 11-12. 
E. The cumulative error doctrine does not apply here. 
The court gave a reasonable doubt instruction indistinguishable from the one approved 
in Victor, though perhaps in violation ofIreland's rules on word choice. The content of the 
remaining instructions is not challenged. In keeping with the most plausible reading of the 
criminal rules, the trial court instructed the jury both before and after the presentation of 
evidence. If it committed any error at all, it was in not repeating some or all of those 
instructions, although no rule or case required that. The victim told a compelling and 
believable story; defendant told preposterous one. Even in the aggregate, the alleged errors 
here were harmless. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the court of appeals on the reasonable doubt issue and 
affirm the court of appeals on the instructional timing issue on the ground that the trial court 
committed no error. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on' ctober 2004. 
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Utah R. Crim. P. 17. The trial 
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in person and 
by counsel. The defendant shall be personally present at the trial with the following 
exceptions: 
(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant may consent in 
writing to trial in his absence; 
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's voluntary 
absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the time for trial shall not prevent the case 
from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered therein shall have the same effect as if 
defendant had been present; and 
(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant from trial for good cause shown 
which may include tumultuous, riotous, or obstreperous conduct. 
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may require the personal attendance of 
the defendant at the trial. 
(b) Cases shall be set on the trial calendar to be tried in the following order: 
(1) misdemeanor cases when defendant is in custody; 
(2) felony cases when defendant is in custody; 
(3) felony cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance; and 
(4) misdemeanor cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance. 
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defendant waives a jury in open 
court with the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution. 
(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant makes written 
demand at least ten days prior to trial, or the court orders otherwise. No jury shall be allowed 
in the trial of an infraction. 
(e) In all cases, the number of members of a trial jury shall be as specified in Section 
78-46-5, U.C.A. 1953. 
(f) In all cases the prosecution and defense may, with the consent of the accused and 
the approval of the court, by stipulation in writing or made orally in open court, proceed to 
trial or complete a trial then in progress with any number of jurors less than otherwise 
required. 
(g) After the jury has been impaneled and sworn, the trial shall proceed in the 
following order: 
(1) The charge shall be read and the plea of the defendant stated; 
(2) The prosecuting attorney may make an opening statement and the defense may 
make an opening statement or reserve it until the prosecution has rested; 
(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the charge; 
(4) When the prosecution has rested, the defense may present its case; 
(5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evidence unless the court, for good 
cause, otherwise permits; 
(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any other appropriate time, the court shall 
instruct the jury; and 
(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either side or on both sides without 
argument, the prosecution shall open the argument, the defense shall follow and the 
prosecution may close by responding to the defense argument. The court may set reasonable 
limits upon the argument of counsel for each party and the time to be allowed for argument. 
(h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified during trial and an alternate juror 
has been selected, the case shall proceed using the alternate juror. If no alternate has been 
selected, the parties may stipulate to proceed with the number of jurors remaining. Otherwise, 
the jury shall be discharged and a new trial ordered. 
(i) Questions by jurors. A judge may invite jurors to submit written questions to a 
witness as provided in this section. 
(1) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge shall control the process 
to ensure the jury maintains its role as the impartial finder of fact and does not become an 
investigative body. The judge may disallow any question from a juror and may discontinue 
questions from jurors at any time. 
(2) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge should advise the jurors 
that they may write the question as it occurs to them and submit the question to the bailiff for 
transmittal to the judge. The judge should advise the jurors that some questions might not be 
allowed. 
(3) The judge shall review the question with counsel and unrepresented parties and 
rule upon any objection to the question. The judge may disallow a question even though no 
objection is made. The judge shall preserve the written question in the court file. If the 
question is allowed, the judge shall ask the question or permit counsel or an unrepresented 
party to ask it. The question may be rephrased into proper form. The judge shall allow 
counsel and unrepresented parties to examine the witness after the juror's question. 
(j) When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury to view the place in which 
the offense is alleged to have been committed, or in which any other material fact occurred, 
it may order them to be conducted in a body under the charge of an officer to the place, 
which shall be shown to them by some person appointed by the court for that purpose. The 
officer shall be sworn that while the jury are thus conducted, he will suffer no person other 
than the person so appointed to speak to them nor to do so himself on any subject connected 
with the trial and to return them into court without unnecessary delay or at a specified time. 
(k) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are permitted to separate or are 
sequestered, they shall be admonished by the court that it is their duty not to converse among 
themselves or to converse with, or suffer themselves to be addressed by, any other person on 
any subject of the trial, and that it is their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until 
the case is finally submitted to them. 
(1) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them the instructions of the 
court and all exhibits which have been received as evidence, except exhibits that should not, 
in the opinion of the court, be in the possession of the jury, such as exhibits of unusual size, 
weapons or contraband. The court shall permit the jury to view exhibits upon request. Jurors 
are entitled to take notes during the trial and to have those notes with them during 
deliberations. As necessary, the court shall provide jurors with writing materials and instruct 
the jury on taking and using notes. 
(m) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they shall be kept together in some 
convenient place under charge of an officer until they agree upon a verdict or are discharged, 
unless otherwise ordered by the court. Except by order of the court, the officer having them 
under his charge shall not allow any communication to be made to them, or make any 
himself, except to ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and he shall not, before 
the verdict is rendered, communicate to any person the state of their deliberations or the 
verdict agreed upon. 
(n) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be informed on any 
point of law arising in the cause, they shall inform the officer in charge of them, who shall 
communicate such request to the court. The court may then direct that the jury be brought 
before the court where, in the presence of the defendant and both counsel, the court shall 
respond to the inquiry or advise the jury that no further instructions shall be given. Such 
response shall be recorded. The court may in its discretion respond to the inquiry in writing 
without having the jury brought before the court, in which case the inquiry and the response 
thereto shall be entered in the record. 
(o) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on its face, it may be corrected by the 
jury under the advice of the court, or the jury may be sent out again. 
(p) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion of all 
the evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing any information or indictment, or any 
count thereof, upon the ground that the evidence is not legally sufficient to establish the 
offense charged therein or any lesser included offense. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 19. Instructions. 
(a) After the jury is sworn and before opening statements, the court may instruct the 
jury concerning the jurors' duties and conduct, the order of proceedings, the elements and 
burden of proof for the alleged crime, and the definition of terms. The court may instruct the 
jury concerning any matter stipulated to by the parties and agreed to by the court and any 
matter the court in its discretion believes will assist the jurors in comprehending the case. 
Preliminary instructions shall be in writing and a copy provided to each juror. At the final 
pretrial conference or at such other time as the court directs, a party may file a written request 
that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the request. The court shall inform 
the parties of its action upon a requested instruction prior to instructing the jury, and it shall 
furnish the parties with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless the parties waive this 
requirement. 
(b) During the course of the trial, the court may instruct the jury on the law if the 
instruction will assist the jurors in comprehending the case. Prior to giving the written 
instruction, the court shall advise the parties of its intent to do so and of the content of the 
instruction. A party may request an interim written instruction. 
(c) At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court reasonably directs, 
any party may file written request that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the 
request. At the same time copies of such requests shall be furnished to the other parties. The 
court shall inform counsel of its proposed action upon the request; and it shall furnish 
counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless the parties waive this requirement. 
Final instructions shall be in writing and at least one copy provided to the jury. The court 
shall provide a copy to any juror who requests one and may, in its discretion, provide a copy 
to all jurors. 
(d) Upon each written request so presented and given, or refused, the court shall 
endorse its decision and shall initial or sign it. If part be given and part refused, the court 
shall distinguish, showing by the endorsement what part of the charge was given and what 
part was refused. 
(e) Objections to written instructions shall be made before the instructions are given 
to the jury. Objections to oral instructions may be made after they are given to the jury, but 
before the jury retires to consider its verdict. The court shall provide an opportunity to make 
objections outside the hearing of the jury. Unless a party objects to an instruction or the 
failure to give an instruction, the instruction may not be assigned as error except to avoid a 
manifest injustice. In stating the objection the party shall identify the matter to which the 
objection is made and the ground of the objection. 
(f) The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and if the court refers to 
any of the evidence, it shall instruct the jury that they are the exclusive judges of all questions 
of fact. 
(g) Arguments of the respective parties shall be made after the court has given the jury 
its final instructions. Unless otherwise provided by law, any limitation upon time for 
argument shall be within the discretion of the court. 
